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BANK COMBINATIONS
TRANSFER by one bank of all or the major part of its business to another
bank by way of sale or pledge has been a frequent occurrence during the past
two decades. To all appearances, this type of conveyance has been the device
most frequently employed' for rescuing banks with either state or national"
charters from financial collapse. It is often used by state banking officials as
an alternative to the winding up and liquidation of closed institutions which
have come into their hands.3 A judicial receivership of a defunct bank may
culminate in the same fashion.4 No less frequently the only parties to the
transfer are the private institutions involved,5 although the assignment may
be carried out under the scrutiny and with the advice of the interested bank-
ing authorities.0 The receiving bank may be either an organization already
existent and functioning, as is usually the case,7 or one created for the express
purpose of relieving the distressed situation by facilitating the introduction
of new capital into the enterprise.8 In the former event, the transaction simu-
lates a technical merger or consolidation, except that the statutory require-
ments for legal combination are not followed, 9 and participating banks do
not lose their separate corporate entities. Where the transferee is newly
created, the transaction bears some resemblance to a corporate reorganiza-
1. A second, but comparatively rarely employed technique for rehabilitating a tot-
tering bank, is the infusion of fresh funds from government agencies. The Reconstruction
Finance Corporation is authorized to loan to any bank or trust company. 47 S rA. 6
(1932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 605 (Supp. 1938).
2. See City National Bank of Huron v. Fuller, 52 F. (2d) 870, 873 (C. C. A. 8th,
1931).
3. Instances include Mann v. Bank of Greenfield, 323 Mo. 1000, 20 S. W. (2d) 502
(1929); Lawhead v. Adams, 113 W. Va. 604, 169 S. E. 330 (1933).
4. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Hon, 48 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) (new
bank already in existence); Sudakovich v. Central Bank of Bingham, 62 Utah 24, 218
Pac. 113 (1923) (transferee newly created).
5. Instances include Burkhalter v. Glenville Bank, 184 Ga. 147, 190 S. E. 644
(1937); Jackson v. Chapman, 263 S. W. 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
6. Caldwell State Bank v. First National Bank, 49 Idaho 110, 286 Pac. 360 (1930);
Andrew v. Peoples Savings Bank, 216 Iowa 252, 249 N. W. 352 (1933).
7. Examples of such transactions are Farmers & Merchants State Bank & Trust
Co. v. Cole, 220 S. W. 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Claus v. Farmers & Stockgrowers
State Bank, 51 Wyo. 45, 63 P. (2d) 781 (1936).
8. Neely v. Rawlings, 64 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; First National Bank
in Ada v. Jackson, 180 Okla. 77, 70 P. (2d) 88 (1937).
9. Corporations, being creatures of the legislature, are without power to consolidate
or merge, unless such authority is conferred by charter or statute. 8 TnomsoN, Cott-
PORATIONS (3d ed., 1927) § 6020. A transaction cannot be a legal consolidation unless
statutory requirements are complied with in entirety. Houston v. Drake, 18 F. Supp.
693 (D. Ariz. 1937). See Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 105.
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tion, but only superficially.' 0 In either situation, the actual conduct of the
participant banks follows a substantially uniform pattern. The transferor,
the "old bank," turns over its assets to the transferee, the "new bank"; the
new bank enters the deposits, and other liabilities, of the old bank on its
books and honors instruments payable by the old bank." On the other hand,
the documentary contract between the parties may assume a wide variety of
forms. The conveyance may be labeled a sale"- of assets in consideration of
the assumption of all 3 or specified liabilities ;14 or it may be called a pledge
of assets as security for a loan, the proceeds of which the new bank, as agent,
is to distribute to the creditors of the old.'0
In several respects these informal bank combinations, whatever their super-
ficial dress, are differentiated from the analogous transactions of commercial
and industrial corporations. First, with but few exceptions, their motivation
is a bona fide endeavor to spare creditors of the distressed financial concern
the losses and delays surrounding liquidation and reorganization.10 Secondly,
there is a growing judicial recognition that banks are not purely private com-
mercial enterprises, but quasi-public institutions dealing with individuals un-
schooled in the intricacies of finance.17 A sizeable number of courts, for
10. In the procedure here under discussion, it is extremely rare that a diminution
of indebtedness is sought, and so the consent of creditors of the transferor is practically
never obtained. Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 Ill. App. 5S$ (1933). The
transaction is usually not under judicial auspices, and so does not have the character of
a judicial sale on execution. Even where the conveyance follows an equity receivership,
the elements of upset price, competitive plans and rival committees, common to equity
reorganizations, are absent. Cf. Farmers National Bank v. Sansing, 285 S. A. 862 (Te..
Civ. App. 1926); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Hon, 48 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 7th,
1931).
11. Assets not assigned may be retained by the old bank to meet obligations not
assumed. Ezzard v. State National Bank, 57 Okla. 371, 157 Pac. 127 (1916). Or they
may be transferred in trust to a third party to indemnify the new bank against loss.
Caldwell State Bank v. First National Bank, 49 Idaho 110, 286 Pac. 360 (1930).
12. Drovers & Mechanics National Bank v. First National Bank, 260 Fd. 9 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1919); Exchange Bank of Novinger v. Turner, 321 Mo. 1104, 14 S. Wv. (2d)
425 (1929).
13. American Bank and Trust Co. v. Hon, 48 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
14. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Peoples Trust & Savings
Bank, 366 Ill. 366, 9 N. E. (2d) 53 (1937); Farmers National Bank %. Sansing, 235
S. IV. 862 (Tex.: Civ. App. 1926).
15. Farmers & Merchants State Bank & Trust Co. %. Cole, 220 S. IV. 354 (Tem.
Civ. App. 1920); Mobley v. Hagedorn Construction Co., 168 Ga. 385, 147 S. F_. 890
(1929).
16. The absorption, it is true, may not be initiated or sponsored by banking authori-
ties, but very often it has been executed under official supervision. See cases cited
supra note 6. Official approval, however, is not generally deemed necessary to the validity
of the transaction. For examples, see cases cited supra note 5. But in Illinois, it has ben
made an essential prerequisite by statute. ILL. AmN. STr. (1934) CIL. 161, § 15.
17. See Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 IIl. 554, 567, 18 N. - 835,
842 (1934). For a collection of judicial declarations to the effect that banks are pecu-
liarly subject to the police power as affected by a public interest, see ZoL mAI, BA,;us
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example, have taken the attitude that while insolvent corporations may in
general be permitted to grant preferences among their creditors, it is against
public or legislative policy to permit banks to discriminate among their
obligees or to dispose of their resources without making provision for all
obligations."' In the third place, where banks go through informal combina-
tion, the consideration supplied by the transferee is invariably, in practical
effect, an undertaking to meet the transferor's liabilities."0 In the case of
commercial corporations, on the contrary, the consideration may be the
issuance of securities to the transferring corporation or its stockholders ;20 or
there may be a failure to provide for any consideration whatsoever.2 ' These
factors in particular serve to identify transfers of bank assets as a discrete
institution, and to set them apart as a peculiar subject for discussion.22
The social benefits involved in this technique for rescuing one bank by
another are imposing. By providing depositors with uninterrupted banking
facilities, it may be possible to avert the far-reaching and disastrous conse-
quences of a loss of confidence in the general banking structure of the com-
munity. Rescue of one institution in distress, furthermore, may spare other
banks in the vicinity the loss of vital cash balances tied up in a closed bank.
23
As another advantage, the assets of the old bank are administered in an
orderly and normal manner by a more or less experienced banking organiza-
tion. No special procedure, encumbered with exhausting legal technicalities,
is necessary, and the transfer can be completed overnight. 2' This method
avoids the waste of a speedy conversion of assets into cash 25 and the delay
& BANKING (1936) § 5722. For discussion of the privilege of corporations in general
to prefer creditors, see Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 320.
18. Leyvraz v. Johnson, 114 Fla. 396, 154 So. 159 (1934); Luikhart v. Hunt, 124
Neb. 642, 247 N. W. 790 (1933) ; Baird v. First National Bank of Williston, 55 N. D.
856, 215 N. W. 810 (1927). But see First National Bank in Ada v. Jackson, 180 01da.
77, 79, 70 P. (2d) 88, 90 (1937).
19. In Claus v. Farmers & Stockgrowers State Bank, 51 Wyo. 45, 63 P. (2d) 781
(1936), the arrangements were given a peculiar twist, with the directors of the old bank
as the immediate purchasers of the insolvent's assets. But the net effect of the transac-
tion was the same.
20. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co., 284 Fed. 161 (D. Del. 1922).
21. Chorpenning v. Yellow Cab Co. of Camden, 113 N. J. Eq. 389, 167 Atl. 12 (1933).
22. For discussions of the liability of a corporation for the debts of its predecessor,
see Notes (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 172; (1938) 32 ILL. L. Rav. 753; (1930) 44
HARV. L. REv. 260; (1926) 40 A. L. R. 273.
23. To encourage the absorption, therefore, neighbor banks may put up a fund to
protect the transferee institution from loss. Bassett v. City Bank & Trust Co., 116 Conn.
617, 165 Atl. 557 (1933). Or they may execute a guaranty against loss to the new bank.
Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Jefferson Trust Co., 186 At. 732 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1936).
The validity of these undertakings is discussed in Note (1937) 17 B. U. L. REV. 695;
(1937) 2 U. NEWARK L. Rv. 182.
24. This was literally the case in Security State Bank v. First National Bank, 26 F.
(2d) 237 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
25. Rapid liquidation consists of a sacrifice of illiquid assets on a market already
depressed by the bank failure. A judicial liquidation is ordinarily of this character. A
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of a slower and more conservative policy.20 Federal deposit insurance, it is
true, now eliminates many of the evils which informal bank combinations
are designed to correct. 27 But the operations of the FDIC, however bene-
ficial, have by no means rendered obsolete the informal combination practice.p
Advantage to the new bank from the transfer consists in the obviation of
a contagious bank failure and in the probability that the transferee will retain
in the future most of the old bank's patronage. Esprit do corps among the
banking fraternity, coupled 'with sincere concern for the public interest, may
also motivate the management of the transferee. But rescue by combination
imposes a serious risk on shareholders and creditors of the absorbing insti-
tution. Amalgamation is feasible only in the case of a transferor whose
assets offer some promise of eventually covering liabilities. If the true value
of the old bank's portfolio falls far short of its obligations, the absorbing bank
may not be able to withstand this gratuitous burden of extra debt. Indis-
criminate and fatal attempts to salvage hopelessly insolvent institutions,
accordingly, have occasionally led to invalidation of these wholesale transfers.20
But most courts have apparently been more deeply impressed with the
beneficial aspects of these transactions 3° and have strained every doctrinal
fiber to uphold them against allegations of invalidity.3 ' Rationales abound.
helter-skelter race for priorities among creditors is an ever-present concomitant, involv-
ing expensive litigation which saps the insolvent estate. Cf. Neely v. Rawlings, 64 F.
(2d) 655 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
26. Delay may be an extreme hardship to creditors whose entire capital is tied up
in the failed enterprise. As to them, immediate, although partial, disbursement may be
far more valuable than eventual full payment.
27. The Corporation must pay insured deposits "as soon as possible" after the bank
closing. Payment may be effected by means of a transferred demand deposit in another
insured bank, or through the organization of a new national bank which assumes the in-
sured deposits. 49 STAT. 695 (1935), 12 U. S. C. A. § 264 (1, 6) (1936). See generally,
Comment (1936) 36 CoL L. REv. 809, 827.
28. Not all banks are embraced in the guaranty scheme. By the end of 1937, 1,035
out of 14,882 banking institutions in the country were not insured. ANUAL Rzro.M
FDIC (1937) 33. And statistical surveys reveal that by far the greater nwnber of L-ank
failures occur among small state banks. See BRUIEw, AciMICN BA: FArMunrS (1935)
46. These constitute most of those still outside the deposit insurance system. A=uA.
REPORT, FDIC (1937) 84. Furthermore, it is the policy of the FDIC to promote the
absorption of struggling banks into other insured institutions before failures occur. A,.-
NUAL REPORT, FDIC (1937) 11.
29. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Peoples Trust & Savings
Bank, 366 Ill. 366, 9 N. E. (2d) 53 (1937) ; cf. Board of Commissioners of Lake County
v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, 73 Ind. App. 76, 123 N. E. 130 (1919).
30. It is often stated that the practice of rescue by combination is a matter of found
public policy. Harris v. Briggs, 264 Fed. 726, 731 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Garvey v.
Bankers Trust Co., 214 Iowa 401, 405, 239 N. IV. 518, 519 (1931).
31. Such challenge usually comes from stockholders of the old bank, who would
othervise be liable, under the terms of the contract of transfer, to the transferee when
it has suffered a deficit from the transaction. See cases cited infra note 71. Another
mode of attack is a direct levy of execution on the transferred assets as still the prop-
erty of the old bank. Burkhalter v. Glenville Bank, 184 Ga. 147, 190 S. E. 644 (1937).
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It is generally held, for instance, that the conveyance is not an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, and so is unaffected by statutes prohibiting finan-
cial institutions from making such assignments.3 2 Statutes containing, by
the court's own admission, mandatory language as to a definite procedure for
the liquidation of insolvent banks have nevertheless been construed as merely
directory. 33 Since the transaction does not purport to be a merger, compliance
with legislative regulations for legal amalgamation is unnecessary.0 4 The
transaction is, further, ultra vires of neither bank.3 5 Nor is the Bulk Sales
Act an obstacle, since it applies only to transfers of chattels.30 Statutes which
forbid insolvent banks to make transfers of assets which result in preferences
among creditors are circumvented in one fashion or another.37 Lastly, although
it is universally ruled that the business of a solvent bank may not be destroyed
through the alienation of all its assets without stockholders' consent,3 1 the
emergency of impending disaster is said to expand the general authority of
the directors to include this drastic action on their own motion.39
Solvent banks have on less frequent occasion made use of similar arrange-
ments to secure the benefits of de jure amalgamation without following the
requisite, but burdensome, legislative procedure. True, none of the ,oial
benefits attending absorption of an insolvent bank are here in evidence. But
these transfers present a significantly different factual picture from combina-
32. O'Malley v. Drovers' State Bank, 181 Minn. 1, 231 N. W. 407 (1930) ; Tatuni
State Bank v. Woolworth, 65 S. W. (2d) 284 (Tex. Com. App. 1933). The reason
commonly assigned for this ruling is that the new bank is bound to pay demands imme-
diately, and not merely out of the proceeds of a liquidation. But cf. Cory Mann George
v. Old, 23 F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
33. Harris v. Briggs, 264 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) ; Valley Bank v. Malcolm,
23 Ariz. 395, 204 Pac. 207 (1922) ; Dolhonde v. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co., 153 So.
71 (La. App. 1934). Contra: Cases cited note 29, supra.
34. City National Bank of Huron v. Fuller, 52 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
35. Houston v. Drake, 18 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1937) (national banks) ; Sherard
State Bank v. Vernon, 243 Ill. App. 122 (1926) (state banks). Contra: Board of Coni-
missioners of Lake County v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, 73 Ind. App. 76, 123
N. E. 130 (1919).
36. Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 Ill. App. 588 (1933).
37. See notes 114, ff., infra, and accompanying text.
38. See note 41, infra.
39. Oskaloosa Savings Bank v. Mahaska County State Bank, 205 Iowa 1351, 219
N. W. 530 (1928); Howard v. Republic Bank & Trust Co., 76 S. W. (2d) 187 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934). This is equally true where national banks are the participants. City
National Bank of Huron v. Fuller, 52 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
No danger is involved in allowing the respective bank managements to be the sole
judges of the expediency of a conveyance, provided good faith is exercised. If the trans-
feror is insolvent, its stockholders have no equity which can be jeopardized. Nor are
creditors likely to be left remediless. See notes 90 and 91, infra, and accompanying text.
But stockholders and creditors of the new bank have much at stake. For their protection,
as well as in the public interest, the approval of some qualified officer should be a condi-
tion precedent to a combination. At least one state statute makes such approval manda-
tory. First National Bank of Woodlawn v. Watkins, 295 Ill. App. 572, 15 N. E, (2d)
611 (1938).
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tions involving an insolvent transferor,4 ° one which does not include the
evasion of legislation relative to the administration of assets of moribund
enterprises. Further, there are ample safeguards for interested parties other
than strict obedience to amalgamation statutes.41 The courts have, accordingly,
supported these transactions, even though devoid of affirmative public ad-
vantage, on the ground that they are not mergers, but merely conveyances
of property.4 2
Although the validity of the transfer is likely to be affirmed, several highly
controversial problems arise. Of primary importance is the question raised
when a creditor of the old bank, whose obligation is seemingly not assumed
by the new bank under the terms of the contract, seeks to hold the transferee
responsible on his claim. It frequently happens that outstanding obligations
of the assignor bank either are expressly excepted, or are overlooked because
they do not appear on the books of the transferor through clerical error,
embezzlement or other cause.43 And if the assignee bank is to be held on
these unassumed obligations aside from, or in spite of, its contract, there
remains ihe further problem of the extent of its liability.
It is generally acknowledged that when a bank or other corporation, as
well as an individual, transfers property in good faith and for ample con-
sideration, the purchaser takes free of obligation to creditors of the vendor.44
But in the teeth of this formula, a majority of decisions have held that the
transferee of all, or substantially all, of a bank's assets is answerable for
unassumed debts of its predecessor.4 One widely-accepted argument in sup-
port of this result where the transferor is insolvent is based on the premise
that an insolvent bank cannot grant preferences among its creditors. 40 Since
40. Of course, the two patterns, in certain instances, may merge into each other.
Thus, the purposes behind a combination may be both to reduce competition and to pre-
vent a failure. Or the solvency of the old bank may be in dispute.
41. Stockholders of the old bank are protected by the rule that the transfer is invalid
unless it has their authorization. See Note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 930, 931. Protection of the
interests of minority, or dissenting, stockholders in this situation is discussed in Notes
(1932) 19 VA. L. REv. 166; (1932) 20 CALiF. L. REv. 420; (1932) 79 A. I R. 624. If
the purpose of the combination is to divert funds from the payment of debts, no reason
exists why it may not be annulled as a fraudulent conveyance by an aggrieved creditor.
42. Drovers & Mechanics National Bank v. First National Bank. 240 Fed. 9 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1919) ; Cory M6fann George Corp. v. Old, 23 F. (2d) $03 (C. C. A. 4th, 192).
43. It is common to itemize the liabilities that the new bank agrees to adopt Even
a provision that "all liabilities" are taken over is ordinarily qualified by the phrase "as
shown by the books" of the transferor. The obligation in question, further, may be a
cause of action not reflected on the old bank's books.
44. Alexander v. State Savings Bank & Trust Co., 281 Ill. App. 98 (1935); Ezzard
v. State National Bank, 57 Okla. 371, 157 Pac. 127 (1916). Any other principle, of
course, would make ordinary commercial activity impossible.
45. For instances, see cases cited in ra notes 47 to 55.
46. This initial principle of equality of treatment may be based on a legislative pro-
hibition of preferences by insolvent banks. Modoc County Bank v. Ringling, 7 F. (2d)
535 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). Or, in absence of statute, it may stem from the corporation
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partial assumption of obligations by the new bank would give rise to dis-
crimination, thereby voiding the conveyance, the parties are presumed, irre-
spective of any express agreement, to have intended a legal transaction, i.e.,
to assume all the transferring bank's obligations.47 Similarly, courts have
read into the assumption clauses of the instrument of transfer an explicit
assumption of all liabilities, 48 even though the result may be an equally
patent misconstruction of the actual intent of the parties.
Another line of reasoning upholding the validity of these transfers is based
on the doctrine that the assets of any corporation, particularly when insolvent,
constitute a trust fund for the benefit of creditors, who are entitled to share
ratably therein. When corporate property is transferred, it remains impressed
with this burden unless full value is given in exchange. But the assumption
of liabilities is not the complete equivalent of cash payment, and is, accord-
ingly, deemed insufficient consideration to discharge the trust.49 The issue
of notice is irrelevant; the transaction not being in the ordinary course of
business, constructive knowledge is imputed to the purchaser both of the
trust character of the property and of all claims upon it." All creditors of
the old bank are thus deemed to have an equitable lien on the assets trans-
ferred, which may be enforced while the property is in the hands of the new
bank.1 The corporation trust fund fiction may also appear in somewhat
varied form.5 2 A less frequently used rationale, but one which is also ap-
plicable where the old bank was solvent, brands the transaction "constructively
fraudulent" as to a creditor who is left remediless when the old bank is
stripped of assets. As a result, the new bank is held in an action in the nature
trust fund theory. Rice v. City of Columbia, 143 S. C. 516, 141 S. E. 705 (1928). Or
from general considerations of public or legislative policy. See cases cited supra note 18.
47. Caldwell State Bank v. First National Bank, 49 Idaho 110, 286 Pac. 360 (1930).
This implicit undertaking has been discovered despite the express understanding of the
parties that none but stipulated liabilities are to be adopted. Security State Bank v.
First National Bank, 26 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) (contract judicially approved).
48. Giganti v. Central Republic Bank & Trust Co., 288 Ill. App. 308, 6 N. . (2d)
486 (1937) ; Sudakovich v. Central Bank of Bingham, 62 Utah 24, 218 Pac. 113 (1923).
49. Erhard v. Boone State Bank, 65 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933). The assump-
tion of liabilities is equivalent to cash only on the theory that adequate provision is made
for all creditors of the transferee. German-American State Bank v. Farmers & Mfer-
chants Savings Bank, 203 Iowa 276, 211 N. W. 386 (1926). But cf. Claus v. Farmers &
Stockgrowers State Bank, 51 Wyo. 45, 63 P. (2d) 781 (1936) (transferee for cash con-
sideration still subject to burdens).
50. Bates v. Madison County Savings Bank, 222 Iowa 370, 269 N. W. 341 (1936).
51. German-American State Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Savings Bank, 203 Iowa
276, 211 N. W. 386 (1926) (specific exception of certain liabilities deemed irrelevant).
52. Where liabilities assumed fall short of assets transferred, the new bank is answer-
able on general equitable considerations. Security National Bank of Tulsa v. Cain, 126
Okla. 202, 259 Pac. 572 (1927). The new bank may be responsible in quasi-contract,
implying that a depositor has an equitable claim to a portion of the bank's funds, l-ug-
gins v. Commercial & Savings Bank, 141 S. C. 480, 140 S. E. 177 (1927).
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of a creditor's bill.5 This concept of constructive fraud may also be used
to bolster a decision resting primarily on some other ground. Thus, to pre-
serve the transfer from the taint of bad faith," the court may discern an
implied engagement to provide for all of the old bank's debts.05
The most common basis for the imposition of liability is to characterize
the transaction, whether or not the transferor was a going concern, as a
de facto merger or consolidation. An enterprise resulting from a merger or
consolidation is subject to all the responsibilities of its constituents. 0 Al-
though ordinarily legal amalgamation requires definite formal action," it is
cogently argued that a banking organization which occupies the place of
its predecessor for all practical purposes will be deemed to do so for legal
purposes as well,58 and any delimitation by the parties of obligations to be
assumed is ineffectual.50 Courts indulge in this reasoning even though usually
the old bank retained its independent corporate existencecO and, in some
cases, was to participate in an accounting at a future date.01 By terming the
disposal of all assets a "de facto dissolution,"0112 a court may satisfy the prin-
ciple that an amalgamation necessarily involves the extinction of one or both
participating corporations. Even an express stipulation by the parties that
there is to be no merger and that the old bank is to remain in existence
may be of no avail, as the court professes to look to the substance of the
53. Williams v. Commercial National Bank of Portland, 49 Ore. 492, 90 Pac. 1012
(1907).
54. There may be actual bad faith in a few instances. Collinsville National Pan!: v.
Esau, 74 Okla. 45, 176 Pac. 514 (1918). But in the greater number fltere has been no
suggestion of such secret trust for the transferor or inadequacy uf consideration as is
ordinarily necessary to render a conveyance fraudulent. The general rule appears to L-
that the assumption of a debtor's liabilities is sufficient consideration to support, Pro
tanto, a transfer of his property. Mix v. Yoakum, 138 Cal. App. 290, 31 P. (2d) 1071
(1934).
55. Security State Bank v. First National Bank, 26 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 8th,
1928). See notes 46 and 47, supra, and accompanying te.xt.
56. See Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 105, 122.
57. Houston v. Drake, 18 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1937).
58. Riegel v. Planters' State Bank, 100 Okla. 42, 227 Pac. 105 (1924). Similar con-
siderations surround the argument that the new bank is a successor to the old, the "mere
continuation of the same corporate personality." Collinsville National Bank: v. lEau,
74 Okla. 45, 176 Pac. 514 (1918).
59. 'Mobley v. Hagedorn Construction Co., 163 Ga. 385, 147 S. E. 890 (1929);
Yantis v. Osborn, 102 Ind. App. 249, 197 N. E. 686 (1935).
60. First National Bank in Carmen v. Willis, 128 Kan. 6S1, 2S0 Pac. 782 (1929).
On the other hand, only minor technical elements may be lacking from a full-fledged
statutory assimilation. Commonwealth v. Merchants National Bank of Allentovn, 323
Pa. 145, 185 AUt. 823 (1936), (1937) 3 U. Prrrs. L. REv. 125.
61. See cases cited supra note 59.
62. See Exchange Bank of Novinger v. Turner, 321 Mo. 1104, 1120, 14 S. AV. (2d)
425, 430 (1929).
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transaction.0 3 Nor is it necessary, to reach this result, that the new bank
have the same stockholders or the same officers, the usual indicia of cor-
porate succession."
The extent of the liability which it is felt the new bank should be required
to bear is probably the prime factor in determining which of these several
theories will be employed as the foundation for the successor bank's responsi-
bility.6 5 Recovery may be allowed for the full amount of the old bank's
obligation, regardless of whether the assets received are sufficient to meet
these obligations. This measure of liability logically accompanies the views
that the transferee has expressly or implicitly agreed to assume its trans-
feror's entire obligation,60 or that the transaction is, in legal contemplation,
a merger.67 The other alternative is to limit the new bank's extra-contractual
liability to the value of resources conveyed. Under this standard of recovery,
implied by trust fund doctrine, "outcast" creditors are entitled only to their
pro rala portion of the assets transferred.08 But even here, the new bank
may be required to disburse a greater amount than it has received. For as
a practical matter there is apparently no scaling down of the liabilities ex-
pressly undertaken by the transferee. 6 On the other hand, in determining
whether the new bank itself ultimately sustains the added burden of "outcast"
obligations, it is necessary to consider the possibility that in the event of
63. Mobley v. Hagedorn Construction Co., 168 Ga. 385, 147 S. E. 890 (1929); c .
American Railway Express Co. v. Downing, 132 Va. 139, 111 S. E. 265 (1922) (involv-
ing commercial corporations).
64. Riegel v. Planters' State Bank, 100 Okla. 42, 227 Pac. 105 (1924) ; Island City
Savings Bank v. Sachtleben, 67 Tex. 420, 3 S. W. 733 (1887) (transferee newly created).
65. Cf. dissent in Huggins v. Commercial & Savings Bank, 141 S. C. 480, 513, 140
S. E. 177, 188 (1927).
66. Even though the assets received were significantly less than the old bank's liabili-
ties, the new bank may be rigorously held to its contractual obligations. American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Hon, 48 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; Giganti v. Central Republic
Bank & Trust Co., 288 Ill. App. 308, 6 N. E. (2d) 486 (1937).
67. Wilson v. Continental National Bank, 130 Neb. 614, 266 N. W. 68 (1936) ; cf.
Northwest Perfection Tire Co. v. Perfection Tire Corp., 125 Wash. 84, 215 Pac. 360
(1923) (commercial corporations). Some courts, however, while employing the fiction
of de facto merger, have regarded it as unfair to extend the transferee's liability beyond
the value of property received. Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 260 Fed. 159
(C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
68. German-American State Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Savings Bank, 203 Iowa
276, 211 N. W. 386 (1926). In some jurisdictions, the trust fund doctrine has been emas-
culated into the equivalent of a rule against fraudulent conveyances. See note 83 infra.
A creditor, accordingly, can recover only an excess of assets received by the tran,fcree,
Malcolm v. Valley Bank, 31 Ariz. 60, 250 Pac. 363 (1926), rehearing denied, 31 Ariz.
284, 252 Pac. 190 (1927).
69. The contention that, by virtue of the unanticipated additional liability, there has
been a partial failure of consideration for the transferee's express promise to pay each
of the other accounts of the old bank was denied in American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Hon, 48 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). But cf. Wilson v. Continental National
Bank, 130 Neb. 614, 266 N. W. 68 (1936). In any event, the expense of computing the
appropriate deduction from each of the other accounts would be prohibitive.
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loss from the transaction the new bank may be able to enforce tie superadded
liability of the old bank's stockholders. 0 Since only a creditor of a bank can
enforce the statutory liability of its stockholder, this question hinges on
whether the assigm-aent is construed as an outright sale, or as a pledge of
assets,71 an issue which plays little or no part in the decisions relative to
the new bank's responsibility for its predecessor's debts. Although the ten-
dency in recent adjudications seems to be to allow such reimbursement,72
no instance has been discovered in which both questions have been litigated
with respect to the same transaction.
Two further problems illustrate the logical ramifications of the several
theories of liability. When the new bank is in liquidation, the merger theory
leads to the result that a claim which would have had a priority in a winding
up of the old bank may be accorded the same treatment, on the ground that
the successor bank has stepped into the shoes of its forerunner in all respects."3
If serious attention is paid to the fiction that the entire assets of an insolvent
transferring bank are a trust fund, even a general creditor of the old bank
may be granted a priority in the new bank's receivership.74 Where liability
is grounded on an implied assumption, presumably the transferor's general
creditors have the same status with respect to the transferee." The second
problem is presented when the new bank has bound itself to pay only a
limited percentage of deposit and other liabilities, and the aggrieved creditor
is a depositor who has not assented to the "reorganization" plan or whose
account has been overlooked. If the transaction is deemed the equivalent
of a merger, the new bank would be responsible for the full amount of the
"outcast" claim, because there has been no consensual or other legal diminu-
tion in the old bank's liability. One old decision goes to this extreme,7" but
more recent holdings treat the obligation as if it has been actually or impliedly
included in an agreement between two separate institutions."
Despite the superabundance of available arguments in favor of holding
the new bank liable, at least to some extent, for the unassumed debts of the
70. See Notes (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 76; (1936) 100 A. L. R. 1276.
71. Compare Hightower v. American National Bank of Macon, 263 U. S. 351 (1923)
with Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 211 N. Y. 430, 105 N. . 60 (1914).
72. See Note (1936) 100 A. L R. 1276.
73. Ifobley v. Hagedorn Construction Co., 168 Ga. 385, 147 S. E. S90 (1929). The
same conclusion may be reached whenever the creditor was a special depositor in the old
bank, the theory being that the creditor has equitable title to a specific res which has
passed to the new bank. Bates v. Madison County Savings Bank, 222 Iowa 370, 269
N. IV. 341 (1936).
74. Ex parte Savings Bank of Rock Hill, 73 S. C. 393, 53 S. . 614 (1905).
75. Cf. Delaney v. Farmers State Bank in Merkel, 115 S. NW. (2d) 735 (Tex. C17.
App. 1938).
76. Island City Savings Bank v. Sachtleben, 67 Tex. 420, 3 S. AV. 733 (187).
77. Sudakovich v. Central Bank of Bingham, 62 Utah 24, 218 Pac. 113 (1923);
Waukesha National Bank v. Cooper & Utter Lumber Co., 213 Wisc. 528, 252 X. AN% 150
(1934). No question of involuntary discharge of debt is here involved, since the plaintiff
retains all his rights against the debtor, the old bank.
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old bank, a substantial minority of courts have granted the new bank com-
plete immunity in this respect7 8 An equally varied and, often contradictory,
set of justifications has been formulated. The common law rule that an
insolvent debtor may, in good faith, prefer certain of his creditors is some-
times said to include banks as well as other corporations." Under this view
a creditor who has been neglected or discriminated against under the terms
of the transfer has no cause for complaint. A recent case arrives at this
result 80 even in the face of two relevant statutes apparently prohibiting such
discrimination. 81 A second method of effecting the immunity of the new
bank limits anti-preference doctrines to insolvent banks and then points out
that the old bank, though perhaps hard pressed, had not passed the verge
of insolvency at the time of the transfer.82 Preferences may be condoned,
furthermore, by arguing that the trust principle does not require that all
creditor-beneficiaries share pro rata in a distribution, but merely that as a
class they have a priority in liquidation.83 Again, the assumption of only a
limited number of liabilities may be deemed sufficiently valuable considera-
tion to permit the transferee to take free of other claims.84 And even though
some creditors are left empty-handed, no basis is discerned for an allegation
of fraud. 85 Claims of de facto merger are countered, even where the officers
or stockholders of both banks are largely the same,80 by pointing to the
continued de jure existence of the old bank, although it may have ceased
78. See cases cited infra note 92.
79. Neely v. Rawlings, 64 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Cosmopolitan Trust
Co. v. S. L. Agoos Tanning Co., 245 Mass. 69, 139 N. E. 806 (1923). See Note (1933)
28 ILL. L. REv. 103.
80. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938), cert. denied 59 Supp. Ct. 71 (1938). The litigated claim was for federal taxes
unpaid by the old bank. While the Federal Government has a statutory lien on the prop-
erty of a delinquent taxpayer, 45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1560 (1935), it is
not valid against any purchaser until notice of it has been filed in the required manner.
45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1562 (1935).
81. Mo. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 5379 provides that a transfer of a bank's business
shall in no wise impair any creditor's position. Although the dissenting judge based his
opinion [Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 655, 662
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938)] on this stipulation, the majority opinion dismisses it in a sen-
tence. Id. at 662. Neither opinion makes note of Mo. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 5318, which
provides all preferential transfers by an insolvent bank shall be void.
82. See cases cited note 102, infra.
83. That is, all debts must be completely satisfied before funds can be appropriated
to any other purpose. Malcolm v. Valley Bank, 31 Ariz. 60, 250 Pac. 363 (1926), re-
hearing denied, 31 Ariz. 284, 252 Pac. 190 (1927) ; see Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State
Bank, 269 Ill. App. 588, 609 (1933).
84. Peoples National Bank of Rocky Mount v. Morris, 152 Va. 814, 148 S. E. 828
(1929).
85. Drovers & Mechanics National Bank v. First National Bank, 260 Fed. 9 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1919).
86. First State Bank of Mangum v. Lock, 113 Okla. 30, 237 Pac. 607 (1925).
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to do business.87 Finally, the new bank may be regarded as merely a liquidat-
ing and disbursing agent, responsible to third parties only for what it has
affirmatively engaged to do.88
In attempting to account for this conflict of decisions, doctrinal considera-
tions seem to be of little real weight, aside from the question of extent of
liability. On different occasions, the same court may apply opposing argu-
ments to substantially the same set of circumstances.80 Yet an attempt to
attach controlling significance to any of the factual elements entering tie
transaction likewise meets with imperfect success. The one factor of dominant
importance appears to be whether or not all the worthwhile assets of the
old bank have been transferred beyond the reach of its creditors. In the great
majority of instances in which the old bank has been left vith nothing out
of which it can meet its residual indebtedness, courts have shown extreme
umvillingness to leave creditors with the sole remedy of going through the
tedious and often futile process of persuing the stockholders and directors
of the institution. 90 It is unnecessary, in this connection, that literally all
assets be conveyed away; the same result is reached if "all valuable assets"
or "practically all assets" are turned over to the new bank. 1 But a respectable
minority of cases in this factual category stand squarely outside of the rule,02
although several which purport to do so may be explained on other grounds.P3
87. Carswell v% National Exchange Bank, 165 Ga. 351, 140 S. E. 755 (1927); First
National Bank in Ada v. Jackson, 180 Okla. 77, 70 P. (2d) S3 (1937).
88. Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 Il. App. 5I8 (1933); Claus v.
Farmers & Stockgrowers State Bank, 51 Wyo. 45, 63 P. (2d) 781 (1936). But cf.
Miles v. Macon County Bank, 187 Mo. App. 230, 173 S. W. 713 (1915) (court unearths
implied obligation).
89. Compare, e.g., Garvey v. Bankers Trust Co., 214 Iowva 401, 239 N. AV. 518 (1931)
with German-American State Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Savings Bank, 203 Iov,
276, 211 N. AV. 386 (1926); Wilson v. Continental National Bank, 130 Neb. 614, 265
N. IV. 68 (1936) with Austin v. Tecumseh National Bank, 49 Neb. 412, 63 N. W. 628
(1896).
90. Erhard v. Boone State Bank, 65 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); cf. American
Railway Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 636, 228 S.NV. 433 (1921), error dis-
missed, 263 U. S. 674 (1923).
91. Daniel Banker College v. Abney, 74 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) ; Waulesha
National Bank v. Cooper & Utter Lumber Co., 213 Wise. 528, 252 X. W. 150 (1934).
92. Neely v. Rawlings, 64 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). Malcolm v. Valley
Bank, 31 Ariz. 60, 250 Pac. 363 (1926), rehearing denvied, 31 Ariz. 28M, 252 Pac. 190
(1927) ; Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 I1. App. 533 (1933) ; Garvey v.
Bankers Trust Co., 214 Iowa 401, 239 N. AV. 518 (1931) ; Austin v. Tecumseh National
Bank, 49 Neb. 412, 68 N. WV. 628 (1896).
93. Creditor's claim would have been unenforceable against old bank: Farmers Na-
tional Bank v. Sansing, 285 S. Wr. 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); People's National Ban:
of Rocky Mount v. Morris, 152 Va. 814, 148 S. E. 828 (1929). Aggrieved creditor guilty
of laches: Short v. First National Bank, 210 Iowa 1202, 232 N. W. 507 (1930), cited
infra note 95; O'Malley v. Drovers' State Bank of South St. Paul, 181 Minn. 1, 231
N. W. 407 (1930). Creditor brought action on theory that transfer was void and sought
directly to attach transferred property as still belonging to old bank: Burkhalter v.
Glennville Bank, 184 Ga. 147, 190 S. E. 644 (1937); People ex rel. Nelson v. Sherard
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On the other hand, where the old bank has retained enough property to
make a remedy against it effective, courts have uniformly denied claims
against the new bank. 4 These results might be taken as illustrative of the
proposition that a preference can be created only when all assets are trans-
ferred. On the contrary, however, in the event of partial transfer, a material
advantage may well be afforded to creditors whose obligations are assumed.
Perhaps a more accurate explanation of these cases would be that the courts
require a creditor to show that he has no real remedy against the old bank
before he can successfully proceed against the new. Only on some such basis
is it possible to account for the anomalous and somewhat startling decision in
First National Bank in Ada v. JacksonY0 Here the court conceded the transfer
of all worthwhile assets might be preferential and so void, but declared that
only the liquidating agent of the old bank could sue for the return of the
transferred assets. 6 But where it is apparent that action against the old
bank will be fruitless, no such prerequisite is necessary for a direct proceeding
against the transferee97
Whether the old bank was solvent or insolvent at the time of transfer
appears to be in itself of but slight consequence when the cases are viewed
en masse. In either event there is apparently just as much likelihood that
liability for all of the old bank's debts will be fastened on its transferee.0 8
Most decisions disregard the issue; 99 others expressly state the only sig-
nificant question to be whether the old bank has been picked clean. 10 When
the courts have explicitly considered solvency as an issue, they have travelled
in diverse directions, depending on local rules. Where the doctrine obtains
State Bank, 258 Ill. App. 168 (1930). To have imposed liability on transferee would
have imputed ultra vires transaction to it. State v. Huxtable, 178 Ark. 361, 12 S. W.
(2d) 1 (1929).
94. Alexander v. State Savings Bank & Trust Co., 281 Ill. App. 88 (1935) ; McCol-
lough v. National Bank of Union City, 127 Pa. Super. 452, 193 Atl. 65 (1937). Cf.
Short v. First National Bank, 210 Iowa 1202, 232 N. IV. 507 (1930).
95. 180 Okla. 77, 70 P. (2d) 88 (1937); (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 548.
96. If the creditor were to be allowed recovery against the new bank, it wag said,
the result would be an illegal preference in his favor. First National Bank in Ada v.
Jackson, 180 Okla. 77, 80, 70 P. (2d) 88, 91 (1937). But no reason was assigned for
not allowing him a pro rata share of the transferred assets, as was done elsewhere when
the conveyance was adjudged void. First National Bank of Littlefield v. Ned, 10 S. W.
(2d) 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
97. A creditor's claim, generally, need be neither liquidated nor reduced to judg-
ment before it can be enforced against the new bank. See note 109, infra.
98. In 32 out of 52 discovered cases, involving the question of extra-contractual
liability, and an insolvent transferor, recovery from the receiving bank was allowed in
21 instances, and denied in 11. In 20 situations where insolvency was not a factor,
recovery was granted 13 times.
99. O'Malley v. Drovers' State Bank of South St. Paul, 181 Minn. 1, 231 N. NA. 407
(1930) ; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Citizens National Bank, 13 F. (2d) 213
(D. N. M. 1924).
100. Security State Bank v. First National Bank, 26 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 8th,
1928); Erhard v. Boone State Bank, 65 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
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that an insolvent bank may prefer creditors, a new bank which receives all
of the transferor's assets would be liable for unassumed debts only if the
assignor bank were solvent.'10 Since in that case the assets conveyed would
exceed liabilities assumed, the purchasing bank would be liable as a fraudu-
lent transferee. Where the rule against preferences by insolvent institutions
prevails, the new bank is held for all obligations only when a discriminatory
transfer has been made by an insolvent institution. -02 It is difficult, however,
to appreciate the reasoning behind these cases. It would seem that here
also if the transferring bank were solvent, the transaction would be similarly
voidable as fraudulent, providing, as is the case, that the transfer embraces
all assets. As indicated above, the question of whether the transaction is
nominally one of sale, pledge or bailment for liquidation plays a minor role.
All but a few opinions do not trouble to analyze the instruments drawn up
by the parties with their complicated provisions for application of the pro-
ceeds and for future adjustment of accounts, but rest content with describing
the transaction as a "sale" or "transfer" and devote no further attention to
the matter. 0 3 Nor is actual knowledge on the part of the new bank of the
existence of unassumed obligations material. In a typical situation, the officers
of neither organization are aware of the liability.104 And although officers of
the transferee may know of the claim, liability does not always follow.10 : This
fact, however, may be treated as an additional circumstance to warrant judg-
ment against the successor bank.100
No distinctions may be drawn on the basis of the nature of the unassumed
claim. Every species of obligation that has come before a court, except that
on an executory contract for personal service, 07 has been held, other factors
aside, to carry over onto the new bank. 0 8 Nor does it appear to be necessary
101. See Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 Il. App. 588 (1933). Solvency
is here used in its "bankruptcy" sense: assets at their fair value insufficient to cover
liabilities.
102. Short v. First National Bank, 210 Iowa 1202, 232 N. AV. 507 (1930); Garvey
v. Bankers Trust Co., 214 Iowa 401, 239 N. \W. 518 (1931). But cf. Erhard v. Boone
State Bank, 65 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
103. One decision found significance in the fact that the assignment %as formally
intended as collateral security only. Overstreet v: Citizens Bank, 12 Okla. 3-3, 72 Pac.
379 (1903). But it has since been overruled. Collinsville National Bank v. Essau, 74
Okla. 45, 176 Pac. 514 (1918). And other courts have disregarded provisions in the
agreement contemplating a reconveyance of unneeded assets. See cases cited supra note
59.
104. Kentucky Joint Stock Land Bank v. Farmers Exchange Bank, 274 Ky. 525,
119 S. W. (2d) 873 (1938); Mann v. Bank of Greenfield, 323 Mo. 1000, 20 S. AV. (2d)
502 (1929).
105. Carswell v. National Exchange Bank, 165 Ga. 351, 140 S. E. 755 (1927); Knass
v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank, 269 Ill. App. 588 (1933).
106. Mobley v. Hagedom Construction Co., 168 Ga. 385, 147 S. 1E. 890 (1929).
107. Dolhonde v. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co., 153 So. 71 (La. App. 1934).
108. Barber v. First State Bank of Hereford, 37 S. W. (2d) 803 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) (liability as escrow agent); Commonwealth v. Merchants National Bank of Allen-
1236 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.48: 122
that the claim, although unliquidated, has been reduced to judgment against
the old bank before suit is instituted against its transferee.10 9 Moreover,
proceedings against the old bank after the transfer may serve to work an
estoppel against a claim of merger in a subsequent action against the new
bank.110
The existence of an apparently applicable federal' or state 112 statute
forbidding preferential treatment of creditors seems to make no appreciable
difference, beyond influencing the court in a few cases forcibly to construe
the instrument of transfer so as to eliminate the preference.1 13 The statute
may be ignored entirely,114 or declared inapplicable to the instant situation.llU
Only actual psychological intent to prefer may be regarded as falling within
the legislative ban, and it has been frankly announced that a minor dis-
crimination will not be allowed to avoid the whole beneficial transaction.
110
town, 323 Pa. 145, 185 Atl. 823 (1936) (liability as surety on a bond); Goodbar v.
Union & Planters Bank and Trust Co., 67 S. W. (2d) 562 (Tenn. App. 1933) (liability
for breach of trust); Sudakovich v. Central Bank of Bingham, 62 Utah 24, 218 Pac.
113 (1923) (embezzled deposit); Peet v. People's Trust & Savings Bank, 90 Calif.
App. 436, 266 Pac. 300 (1928) (claim for conversion); Dupoyster v. First National
Bank of Wickliffe, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1153, 96 S. W. 830 (1906) (liability to a stock-
holder). But cf. LaRue v. Bank of Columbus, 165 Ky. 669, 178 S. W. 1033 (1915).
109. Delaney v. Farmers State Bank in Merkel, 115 S. W. (2d) 736 (Te,. Civ, App.
1938); cf. Wilson v. Continental National Bank, 130 Neb. 614, 266 N. W. 68 (1936).
Accord: Cobb v. Interstate Mortgage Corp., 20 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
One decision, in order to avoid the operation of the statute of limitations, enunciates
an opposite rule. Williams v. Commercial National Bank of Portland, 49 Ore. 492, 90
Pac. 1012 (1907), cited sipra note 53. But cf. Valley Bank v. Malcolm, 32 Ariz. 395,
204 Pac. 207 (1922).
110. First State Bank of Mangum v. Lock, 113 Okla. 30, 237 Pac. 607 (1925). But
cf. Wilson v. Continental National Bank, 130 Neb. 614, 266 N. W. 68 (1936).
111. REv. STAT. § 5242 (1875), 12 U. S. C. A. § 91 (1936). This statute is, of course,
applicable only to national banks.
112. Tax. Ray. STAT. (1935): § 532 substantially follows the federal statute, cited
supra note 111.
113. Modoc County Bank v. Ringling, 7 F. (2d) 535 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; Miller v.
First National Bank of South Bend, 103 Ind. App. 99, 1 N. E. (2d) 671 (1936).
The chain of reasoning adducing this result has been discussed above in the text
accompanying notes 46 and 47, supra. "
114. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938), cert. denied, 59 Sup. Ct. 71 (1938), cited supra note 80. In McCollough v.
National Bank of Union City, 127 Pa. Super. 452, 193 Atl. 65 (1937), a national bank
was the discriminatory transferor, but the opinion does not advert to the federal statute,
cited .rupra note 111.
115. A statute providing for the assumption of all liabilities when a bank sells all its
assets is inapplicable when there is a sale of specified assets at a specified price, although
the whole of the transferring bank's resources is involved. Neely v. Rawlings, 64 F. (2d)
655 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). An anti-preference stathte does not apply to a transfer in good
faith for a present consideration, but only to transfers which are in satisfaction of pre-
existing debts. Burkhalter v. Glennville Bank, 184 Ga. 147, 190 S. E. 644 (1937).
116. Burkhalter v. Glennville Bank, 184 Ga. 147, 190 S. E. 644 (1937); Claus v.
Farmers & Stockgrowers State Bank, 51 Wyo. 45, 63 P. (2d) 781 (1936).
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Even where the court recognizes a breach of a statutory provision and declares
the transfer void, the result may be factually the same as that reached under
the trust fund doctrine,1 7 or the court may deny the creditor any effective
remedy whatever." 8
None of the considerations thus far discussed completely reflect the real
issues implicit in the controversy between a "frozen-out" creditor, whose
claim is usually fully meritorious, and the new bank, which has philanthropi-
cally undertaken the burdens of its assignor, frequently suffering considerable
loss in the process. In allowing recovery, not only is an innocent organiza-
tion to be penalized, but the additional burden may seriously jeopardize the
interest of depositors of both the old and new banks who have refrained from
withdrawing their accounts from the transferee in reliance on the financial
soundness of the transaction. Furthermore, large holes may be eaten into
the capital which public spirited citizens have contributed to the new venture.
These fears have been openly expressed in some of the cases decided in favor
of the transferee."19 In line with the almost unanimous policy of regarding
these combinations as valid, other courts have admittedly balked at taking
any step which might discourage them. 20 In cases where the old bank has
sacrificed the interests of its other creditors to those of its depositors, a
decision upholding the discrimination is in accord with the policy, enunciated
by statute in an increasing number of states, of preferring depositors in bank
liquidations.' 21
But these considerations may be more theoretical than real. Usually the
unassumed claim is so minor that the new bank's position would not be
impaired by granting it. The very real possibility exists, moreover, that by
virtue of the additional business acquired, the new bank has been more than
compensated for the obligations it has expressly undertaken. 122 The trans-
feree, also, may be able to indemnify itself if the transaction has been so
arranged as to permit it to enforce the statutory liability of the old bank's
stockholders. 2 3 Most courts, accordingly, appear to have felt that the equities
weigh most heavily with the neglected creditor.
117. The transferee, having no right or title to te assets in question, holds them in
trust for the old bank's creditors. Jackson v. Chapman, 263 S. V. 958 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924).
118. First National Bank in Ada v. Jackson, 180 Okla. 77, 70 P. (2d) 83 (1937),
cited supra note 95. The implication of the decision is that the creditor's only course is
to induce the receiver of the old bank to sue the new bank for repossession of all the
transferred property.
119. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co., 96 F. (2d) 655, 659 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938),
cert. denied, 59 Sup. Ct. 71 (1938). Short v. First National Bank, 210 Iowa 1202, 1209,
232 N. NV. 507, 510 (1930).
120. Garvey v. Bankers Trust Co., 214 Iowa 401, 405, 239 N. WN. 518, 519 (1931).
121. See Comment (1932) 41 YA.u, L. J. 432; Note (1933) 86 A. L R. 1310.
122. See Bowerman v. First Merchants' National Bank, 211 Ind. 344, 350, 7 N. E.
(2d) 198, 202 (1937); American State Bank of Detroit v. Aaron, 271 Mid. 147, 156,
260 N. V. 141, 144 (1935).
123. See note 70, supra.
